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This Article examines how well the Alaska Court System meets the
needs of abused and neglected children, their troubled families
and society more generally. The Article provides an overview of
state and federal laws that govern Child in Need of Aid ("CINA ")
cases in Alaska as well as the procedural steps of a CINA adjudi-
cation. It then discusses the data and findings of the Alaska Judi-
cial Council's assessment of the CINA process, highlighting how
the court system handles each of the stages in a CINA case, in-
cluding reasonable efforts findings, delay issues and adequacy of
notice and party representation. This Article concludes by offer-
ing recommendations for improving the court process for Alaska's
children in need of aid.
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 19, 1996, the Anchorage Daily News reported
on its front page "an alarming increase in the incidence of child
abuse and neglect in this country... . "' The number of these child
abuse cases doubled from an estimated 1.4 million cases in 1986 to
an estimated 2.8 million in 1993.2 Alaska has by no means escaped
this crisis. The Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services re-
ported a 67% increase in reports of harm to children from 1989 to
1993,' and a 99.4% increase from 1989 to 1995. 4
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The court's role in child welfare cases has evolved and become
more complex over the last two decades. In the 1970's, the juve-
nile court was expected only to determine whether a child had
been maltreated, and the focus was on the need to rescue the child
from abusive or neglectful parents In 1980, Congress responded
to problems in the child welfare system by changing its policy to-
ward child welfare. Now the courts are expected to help reform
troubled families while at the same time protecting the children. If
family preservation fails, the court is expected to ensure that each
maltreated child receives a safe, permanent and stable home.'
These cases deeply affect the people directly involved. For
the child who is the subject of a child in need of aid proceeding (a
"CINA" case),8 being separated from the parents is a highly trau-
matic event. Young children have different perceptions of time
than do adults. From the child's perspective, ninety days (the
length of time between court review hearings for children taken
out of the home) is an entire summer or a third of the school year.
As an experienced juvenile court judge has noted, even children
who have been abused or neglected often miss their parents and
long to be reunited with them.
CINA cases also affect society in general. Caring for children
in foster care is expensive. Caring for children with serious be-
havioral and emotional problems is more expensive still, and some
say that the population of foster children suffers increasingly from
these problems. Successful interventions might help foster chil-
dren grow up to become productive citizens, while unsuccessful in-
terventions will not break the cycles of abuse and dysfunction."
ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1994) [hereinafter DFYS FY 1993 ANNUAL REPORT].
4. See DIVISION OF FAMILY AND YOUTH SERVICES, FISCAL YEARS 1994 AND
1995 ANNUAL REPORT 12 tbl. 1 (1996) [hereinafter DFYS FY 1994 & 1995
ANNUAL REPORT].
5. See MARK HARDIN, JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PERMANENCY
PLANNING REFORM: ONE COURT THAT WORKS 1 (1993).
6. Congress changed its policy by passing the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-677 (1994). The legal requirements of the
Act are discussed in more detail in Part II.
7. See ALAN WATAHARA & TERRI LOBDELL, THE CHILDREN NOBODY
KNOwS: CALIFORNIA'S FOSTER CARE-DEPENDENCY SYSTEM 7 (1990).
8. A court can assume jurisdiction over a minor child if it finds the child to
be a child in need of aid as a result of parental neglect or abuse. See ALASKA
STAT. § 47.10.010(a) (Michie 1996).
9. See Leonard Edwards, Preface, in WATAHARA & LOBDELL, THE
CHILDREN NOBODY KNOWS, supra note 7, at 2.
10. Several studies have noted connections between abuse or neglect of a
child and later development of violent and delinquent behavior. See TERENCE P.
THORNBERRY, URBAN DELINQUENCY AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, INITIAL FINDINGS:
RESEARCH SUMMARY (1994); CATHY SPATZ WIDOM, THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE
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CINA cases are among the most difficult cases for the courts.
Aside from the practical difficulty of deciding what is best for
someone else's children, these cases present a very real potential
for conflict among the rights of children, parents, tribes and institu-
tional players such as the court system, the Department of Law,
the Public Defender and the Department of Health and Social
Services." For example, a troubled parent has the right to have
enough time to work through a case plan; yet children need cer-
tainty and prompt decisions. The parties look to judges to hold
people accountable, yet many judges feel they lack the expertise or
the authority to manage cases actively.
In 1993, Congress approved grants to state court systems to
improve their handling of child maltreatment cases. Courts were
to assess how they handle abuse, neglect, foster care and adoption
litigation (using methodical observation and collection of data),
then develop a plan to improve the administration of ustice in fos-
ter care and adoption cases and implement the plan.' The legisla-
tion anticipated examining issues such as completeness and depth
of hearings (emphasizing effective compliance with state and fed-
eral mandates), sufficient and timely notice to parties, quality of
parties' legal representation, efficient and timely decision-making,
adequacy of funding and quality of treatment of parties. The leg-
islation also encouraged courts to assess the selection and training
of judicial officers, judicial time to prepare for and conduct hear-
ings, role and training of court staff, case flow management to
avoid delays, selection and training of attorneys and guardians ad
litem ("GAL") and the use of technology in order to plan fully for
improved court roles in foster care.13 The Alaska Court System
contracted with the Alaska Judicial Council to carry out the as-
sessment.
This Article provides an overview of the Alaska Judicial
Council's assessment. Part II reviews the intent and major provi-
sions of the federal and state laws governing CINA cases in
Alaska, as well as their interpretation by Alaska courts. Part III
discusses the data and findings from the assessment, including in-
formation about the scope of child abuse and neglect cases in
Alaska and the court system's role in each legal stage of the CINA
process. Part IV offers recommendations for improving the court
(1992).
11. Within the Department of Health and Social Services, the Division of
Family and Youth Services ("DFYS") handles child abuse and neglect matters in
Alaska.
12. See MARK HARDIN, IMPROVING STATE COURT'S PERFORMANCE IN CHILD
PROTECTION CASES: USER'S MANUAL FOR CONDUCTING YOUR COURT As-
SESSMENT 1 (1995).
13. See id. at 4.
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process for Alaska's children in need of aid. Part V concludes with
a brief comment on the importance of improving Alaska's foster
care system. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
II. THE LAW GOVERNING CINA CASES IN ALASKA
Child in Need of Aid cases are governed by a combination of
laws, primarily the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980,' Alaska Statutes section 47.105 and the Alaska Su-
preme Court Child in Need of Aid Rules ("CINA Rules").' 6
A. Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
In 1980, Congress found that foster care systems across the
country were failing to provide maltreated children with stable and
permanent homes. It found that children were being needlessly
removed from their homes and placed into foster care, were re-
peatedly moved from foster home to foster home and were left in
foster care indefinitely without finding permanent placements. To
address these problems, and to ensure the overall quality and
safety of foster care placements, Congress created a comprehen-
sive set of requirements and fiscal incentives to improve state fos-
ter care practice."
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act broadened
the role of state courts in cases involving abused and neglected
children. Before 1980, state court judges addressed two basic ques-
tions in such cases: whether the child had been abused and ne-
glected, and whether the child should be removed from the home.'9
Now, the Adoption Assistance Act requires more from state
courts. First, before removing the child from the home or moving
to terminate parental rights, the court must determine whether the
child welfare agency has made "reasonable efforts" to provide so-
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-677 (1994).
15. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10 (Michie 1996).
16. ALASKA R. CINA P. Child in Need of Aid cases involving Indian children
are also governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("ICWA"), 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-1923 (1994). ICWA requires courts to recognize the critical role of the
child's tribe in determining the future of the child. For this reason, ICWA often
sets stricter standards than do Alaska Statutes section 47.10 and the Alaska CINA
Rules to be applied when adjudicating an Indian child as a child in need of aid.
These differences in the law will be noted where appropriate throughout this Ar-
ticle.
17. See MARK HARDIN, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TEN YEARS LATER:
IMPLEMENTATION OF P.L. 96-272 BY THE COURTS (1990). Public Law 96-272 is
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-677 (1994).
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1979).
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cial services and parent education to the family.2' Second, a case
plan must be developed for each child in foster care, and must be
reviewed at least once every six months for progress toward re-
turning home or being placed for adoption.2' Third, the court must
hold a hearing within ei hteen months to determine a permanent
placement for the child. Finally, courts must implement proce-
dural safeguards for parents when children are removed from the
home or when there are changes in placement or visitation.2
The Adoption Assistance Act also reorganized federal fund-
ing for foster care to give states greater incentive to find children
permanent homes. It created a new funding source for social
services to assist parents and prevent removal from the home and
provided maintenance funds and AFDC eligibility for foster par-
ents.24 While Congress repealed some of the Act's financial incen-
tives to states in 1994,' the procedural protections and emphasis
on permanency planning remain. Most of the Adoption Assistance
Act's requirements have been incorporated into Alaska law
(Alaska Statutes section 47.10) and the Alaska CINA Rules. The
federal courts have issued few rulings interpreting the Act.26
B. Alaska Statutes Section 47.10
Alaska Statutes section 47.10 governs CINA cases and foster
care.' Key provisions permit the state to take emergency custody
of a neglected or abused child, seek placement out of the home
and petition for termination of parental rights. The statute incor-
porates many of the requirements of the federal Adoption Assis-
tance Act, and protects the confidentiality of children's proceed-
ings.' The statute addresses four main issues: jurisdiction of the
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994).
21. See id § 671(a)(16).
22. See id. § 675(5)(C). Alaska Statutes section 47.10.080() also calls for the
court to review the case 18 months after the child is removed from the home. Un-
til recently, Alaska courts held permanency planning hearings only sporadically.
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C).
24. See iL
25. See Pub. L. No. 103-432 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(b)
(1994)).
26. The only question thoroughly addressed by the federal courts is whether
parents and children have a private right of action to sue the state government for
damages for violations of the Adoption Assistance Act, such as failure to comply
with a case review plan or failure to use reasonable efforts. In Suter v. Artist M.,
503 U.S. 347 (1992), the United States Supreme Court determined that the Act
did not create a private right to sue the state for damages.
27. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10 (Michie 1996).
28. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-677 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.090; see also 25
U.S.C. § 1912(c) (1994); ALASKA R. CINA P. 22.
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court, emergency custody and temporary placement, adjudication
and disposition, and termination of parental rights.
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.010(a)(2) sets out the six situa-
tions that create CINA jurisdiction in the court:
(A) the child is habitually absent from home or refuses to accept
available care; or the child has no one caring or willing to pro-
vide care, including abandonment by the parent;29
(B) the child needs substantial medical care or mental health
care that the parent has knowingly failed to provide;
(C) the child has suffered or is likely to suffer substantial physi-
cal harm caused by the parent or by the parent's failure to su-
pervise the child;
(D) the child has been or is likely to be sexually abused;
(E) the child is committing delinquent acts as a result of the par-
ent's pressure or approval;
(F) the child has suffered substantial physical abuse or neglect as
a result of conditions created by the parent-
Few of these provisions have engendered much litigation.
One exception, however, has been the language in subsection A:
"having no parent, guardian, custodian, or relative caring or willing
to provide care."31 In one case, the trial court cited subsection A
when it terminated the parental rights of a mother who was willing
but unable to care for her children (the mother could not meet the
children's significant needs for structure and nurturing). 2 The su-
preme court disagreed with the trial court's reading of the statute,
holding that the rights of a willing parent could.not be terminated
for that reason. It interpreted subsection A to cover only situa-
tions where a child refuses the parent's care or where the child has
been abandoned by the parent, situations of equal seriousness to
the conditions described in subsections B-F. It held that inability
to care must arise under one of those sections, not just a general-
ized inability to meet a child's needs. In another case, the su-
preme court held that adjudication is inappropriate if a relative of
29. "Parent" here refers to parents, guardians, or custodians. For purposes of
subsection (A), the court also will consider whether a suitable relative is caring or
willing to provide care for the child. See In re J.L.F., 912 P.2d 1255, 1260-61
(Alaska 1996).
30. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2).
31. "Caring" is defined as providing for the physical, emotional, mental, and
social needs of the child. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.990(1).
32. See In re S.A., 912 P.2d 1235, 1239, 1242 (Alaska 1996).
33. The court overruled contrary language or holdings in three of its previous
cases. See id at 1242. This ruling provoked a strongly worded dissent, arguing
that subsection (A) is concerned with performance, not with the good intentions
or willingness of a parent already shown to be incapable. See id. at 1243.
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ordinary parenting ability is willing to care for the children.3
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.020 allows a state social worker
who investigates and substantiates a report of harm to a child to
file a petition for emergency custody.3 The Alaska Division of
Family and Youth Services ("DFYS") can take emergency custody
of a minor under circumstances indicating the need for immediate
removal from the home, such as abandonment, gross neglect
threatening the child's life or health, child abuse or neglect' or
sexual abuse.' DFYS commences court proceedings by filing a pe-
tition for temporary custody or a petition for adjudication, alleging
that the child is in need of aid under Alaska Statutes section
47.10.010(a).3 1 At this hearing, the court determines whether there
is probable cause to believe the minor is a child in need of aid and
that the child's welfare requires immediate assumption of cus-
tody.39 In addition to the probable cause finding, the court also de-
cides if DFYS made reasonable efforts to offer services to the
family to prevent removal from the home.4° The possible outcomes
of the temporary custody hearing are determined by statute and
applied in the court rules.41 If the court finds probable cause to
believe that the child is a child in need of aid, it can return the
child to the parents subject to the supervision of DFYS, or it can
approve removal from the home, committing the child to DFYS
for temporary placement, usually in foster care. 2 If the court does
34. See In re J.L.F., 912 P.2d at 1260-61.
35. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.020 (Michie 1996); ALASKA R. CINA P. 6(b).
36. Alaska Statutes section 47.17.290 defines "child abuse or neglect" as
"physical injury or neglect, mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or
maltreatment of a child under the age of 18 by a person under circumstances that
indicate the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby."
37. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.142 (a). Emergency removal under ICWA re-
quires a showing of "imminent physical damage or harm." 25 U.S.C. § 1922
(1994).
38. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 7(a). Special notice provisions apply for Indian
tribes. See id. (applying 25 U.S.C. § 1912).
39. See id. 6(b)(3); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.142. In the case of an Indian child,
the court may not order removal unless necessary to prevent imminent physical
harm to the child. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 6(b)(3) (applying 25 U.S.C. § 1922
(1994)). Many CINA workers refer to this hearing as a probable cause hearing.
40. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 10(c)(4), 15(g) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)
(1994)). The "reasonable efforts" requirement can be fulfilled by counseling, su-
pervision, parenting classes, or other services to strengthen the family and help
the parent. In cases involving Indian children, DFYS must satisfy the court that it
made "active efforts" to provide services to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family and that these efforts were unsuccessful. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1994).
41. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.030(c); ALASKA R. CINA P. 10(c); E.A. v.
State, 623 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Alaska 1981).
42. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.142(e); ALASKA R. CINA P. 10(c)(2)-(4).
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not find probable cause to believe that the child is in need of aid, it
dismisses the petition43 and returns the child to the parents."
For adjudication to occur, Alaska Statutes sections
47.10.020(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) require DFYS to petition the court
to adjudicate the child a child in need of aid.4' To make its adjudi-
catory findings, the court hears evidence or reviews stipulations,
then makes findings of fact as to whether the child is a child in
need of aid.'" DFYS has the burden of proving by a pre onderance
of the evidence that the child is a child in need of aid. If it finds
the child to be in need of aid, the court orders a disposition.48 At
the disposition hearing, the court decides the placement for the
child, and addresses the case plan for the parents.49 The court has
four choices in determining the placement of the child. First, if the
court finds the child in need of aid, it may order the child commit-
ted to DFYS for placement in an appropriate setting.' Second, if
the court finds the child in need of aid, it may order the child re-
leased to the parents or other suitable person, with or without the
supervision of DFYS. 5' Third, if clear and convincing evidence
shows that the child is in need of aid as a result of parental conduct
that is likely to continue, the court may terminate the rights of one
or both of the parents and commit the child to DFYS or to a legal
guardian.52 DFYS may also consent to the child's adoption at this
43. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 10(c)(1). The court may dismiss any petition at
any point based on good cause and return the child to the parent. See id. 7(f).
44. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(e).
45. See id § 47.10.020(a)(1)(B), (a)(2).
46. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 15(d).
47. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 15(c).
48. Before the disposition hearing, DFYS prepares a report detailing family
behavior, previous efforts to work with the family, reasons why the child can not
be protected in the home, and a description of any harm that might result to the
child from removal. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.081(b); ALASKA R. CINA P.
16(a). The guardian ad litem ("GAL") also writes and files a report summarizing
the child's status and recommending to the court things the parents and DFYS
should do to promote the child's best interests. (The GAL's report is not re-
quired by court rule or state law.) Disposition for an Indian child requires addi-
tional efforts to place the child in an Indian home, in accord with the placement
preferences of ICWA. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 16(a) (applying 25 U.S.C. § 1915
(1994)).
49. CINA Rule 17(a) defines the purpose of a disposition hearing as "to de-
termine the appropriate disposition of a child who has been adjudicated a child in
need of aid."
50. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(1). The placement, which may last for
two years or until the minor's 19th birthday, may not be extended without proof
that the child continues to be in need of aid. See id. § 47.10.083.
51. See id. § 47.10.080(c)(2).
52. See id. § 47.10.080(c)(3).
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point.' Finally, if the court does not find the child in need of aid, it
must order the child released to the parent's custody and dismiss
the case.'
Finally, Alaska Statutes section 47.10.080(c)(3) allows for
termination of parental rights. The court will terminate parental
rights and responsibilities only after DFYS proves that the child
should be adjudicated a child in need of aid,56 that the parental
conduct caused the child's neglect or abuse,' and that the conduct
is likely to continue.58 DFYS is required to show this conduct by
clear and convincing evidence. r
The court can terminate parental rights in cases of physical
abandonment of the child.' To terminate on this ground, the court
must find that the parent has shown a conscious disregard for pa-
rental obligations that led to destruction of the parent-child rela-
tionship." The acts of the parent must be willful and not caused by
circumstances beyond the parent's control. For this reason, the
Alaska Supreme Court has held that long-term incarceration and
mental illness are not sufficient to justify termination of parental
rights under the statute.63 In 1996, the Alaska legislature amended
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.080 to let the court consider incar-
ceration as a factor if the sentence length is significant considering
the child's age and need for supervision, and if the parent has
failed to make adequate provision for the child's care while the
parent is in prison. 4
The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted various provisions
of this statute as attempting to balance the potentially competing
rights of parents to the custody and control of their children
53. See id. § 47.10.080(d).
54. See id. § 47.10.080(e).
55. See id. § 47.10.080(c)(3).
56. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 15(c).
57. See id.
58. See In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941, 946 (Alaska 1994); R.C. v. State, 760 P.2d
501, 505 (Alaska 1988); ALASKA R. CINA P. 18(c)(1) (applying ALASKA STAT. §
47.10.080 (Michie 1996) and ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180 (Michie 1996)).
59. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3); ALASKA R. CINA P. 15(c), 18(c)(1).
Different standards apply for Indian children. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(t), 1913
(1994).
60. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3).
61. See A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 820 (Alaska 1995).
62. Id. at 822; see also In re R.K., 851 P.2d 62, 66 (Alaska 1993).
63. See A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d at 820-24; Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436, 439-
440 (Alaska 1983).




against the interest of a child in an adequate home.65 In an early
case, the court acknowledged the "serious and substantial" nature
of parental rights, while noting that "in recent years the courts
have become increasingly aware of the rights of children.""6
Taken as a whole, however, the Alaska Supreme Court's
CINA decisions seem to resolve the tension between parents' and
children's rights in favor of parents, at least in the context of adop-
tion or termination of parental rights proceedings. For example,
the court recently noted that "[t]he private interest of a parent
whose parental rights may be terminated via an adoption petition
is of the highest magnitude."" In an earlier case, the court said
that the statute was designed to help reintegrate children into the
family and to allow the resumption of parental control." In an-
other decision, the court overturned a trial judge's CINA adjudica-
tion because the judge had considered the best interests of the
child as part of its CINA decision. The court's strong statements
about parental rights are consistent with the assessment's general
findings, discussed later, that the children's interests in CINA cases
often take second or third place to parents' rights and other par-
ties' institutional needs, resulting mainly in delayed permanency
for Alaska's children in need of aid.
C. The Child in Need of Aid Rules
The Alaska Supreme Court has the constitutional authority to
adopt rules governing procedural matters in CINA and other
cases.70 The court's CINA Rules were designed to promote fair-
ness, accurate fact-finding, quick determination, the best interests
of the child and the preservation of family life.71 The rules, which
65. See In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518, 526 (Alaska 1979); In re D.C., 596 P.2d 22,
23 (Alaska 1979) (citing In re S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190, 1201 (Alaska 1976)).
66. D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Alaska 1973) (footnote omitted).
67. In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 279 (Alaska 1991) (quoting several U.S. Su-
preme Court cases and Alaska cases affirming parents' rights). The court subse-
quently reaffirmed that statement in another termination case, In re J.L.F., 828
P.2d 166, 170 (Alaska 1992) (overruled on other grounds).
68. See L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 835 (Alaska 1976).
69. See Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436, 439-40 (Alaska 1983). The supreme
court instructed the trial court not to consider the child's best interests until after
the adjudication (in other words, not until disposition). See id. The court rejected
the state's argument, based on language in Alaska Statutes section 47.10.082 that
the child's best interests should be a significant, but not dispositive, consideration
at each step in determining whether to terminate parental rights. See id.
70. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 1(d). The Judicial Council's director, William T.
Cotton, was the court rules attorney and reporter of the committee that com-
pletely redrafted the CINA Rules in 1987.
71. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 1(c).
[Vol. 14:1
CHILDREN IN NEED OF AID
detail the steps courts must follow from the beginning to end of a
CINA case, incorporate most of the requirements of the federal
and state statutes. They set out the required court procedures
and findings in chronological order for each stage of the proceed-
ings.
III. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
This section presents specific findings about how the court sys-
tem handles each of the stages in a Child in Need of Aid case, from
the state's investigation into reports of harm to children through
adjudication, disposition and post-disposition reviews. The find-
ings are based on data collected from five major sources: (1) a de-
tailed study of case files in four courts;73 (2) interviews with attor-
neys, judges, GALs, tribal representatives and others in each of the
four communities and interviews with other persons; (3) observa-
tions of actual hearings in three courts;74 (4) analyses of the laws,
court rules and cases governing CINA cases; and (5) input from
the public, the Advisory Committee for the project and special in-
terest organizations. Contained within these findings are discus-
sions of some of the different procedures found in each of the four
court locations studied.
A. Demographics
In fiscal year 1993, the DFYS received 14,617 reports of harm
involving 10,521 children. 5 Of these reports, DFYS investigated
9,323 and substantiated neglect or abuse in 4,316 cases, removing
children from their homes in 6% of the investigations. 76 In 1995,
72. One hearing required by the Adoption Assistance Act and state statute is
missing from the CINA Rules. 42 U.S.C. section 675(5)(C) (1994) and Alaska
Statutes section 47.10.080() call for a permanency planning hearing 18 months
after a child is removed from home. This hearing requires findings similar to
those required by Rule 19(d), the annual review hearing, but also requires the
court to decide whether the child should return home, remain in out-of-home care
for a specified period of time or be adopted. Rule 19(d) only requires the court to
find whether the case plan establishes a permanent plan. The court's CINA Rules
committee currently is considering an amendment to include the permanency
planning hearing.
73. The four courts were the superior courts of Anchorage, Bethel, Fairbanks
and Juneau.
74. Staff observed hearings in Anchorage, Bethel and Fairbanks, but not in
Sitka.
75. See DFYS FY 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 8 (reporting that
this represented an increase of 18% over FY92, and an increase of 67% since
1989).
76. Types of harm reported in FY93 include 33 reports of abandonment, 316
of mental injury, 2,249 of sexual abuse, 4,817 of physical abuse, and 7,202 of ne-
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reports of harm increased to a total of 15,706 for the state.' Of
these, 10,945 were referred, 6,584 were investigated and 3,513 were
substantiated.78
Children involved in the 1995 substantiated investigations
were almost equally divided between girls and boys. 9 However,
Alaska Natives and African-Americans were over-represented
compared to their numbers in the general population. Forty-six
per cent of the children involved in substantiated investigations
were Alaska Native or American Indian, 39% were Caucasian, 6%
were African-American, 2% were Hispanic, 2% were
Asian/Pacific-Islander or other and 5% were unknown.80 Alaska
Natives constitute approximately 16% of the general population in
Alaska and African-Americans constitute about 4%.
Children involved in reports of harm in 1995 resembled the
group involved in substantiated reports, except that Natives consti-
tuted a smaller percentage of children involved in reports of harm
as compared to substantiated reports of harm. In terms of ethnic-
ity, forty-three percent were Caucasian, 35% were Alaska Native,
6% were African-American, 2% were Hispanic, 1% were
Asian/Pacific Islander, 1% were other and 12% were unknown.81
Along gender lines, the children were closely divided between boys
and girls." In addition, about 60% of the children involved in re-
glect. Id. at 9, 10.
77. See Oct.1, 1995, Fiscal Year 1995 Prober Data Tables from DFYS.
78. See id. DFYS reported slightly lower numbers of 15,465 reports of harm
and 10,402 investigations. See DFYS FY 1994 & 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 4, at 49. Of those, 9,529 resulted in completed investigations and 4,137 were
substantiated investigations. See id. The report cited a figure of 3,575 abused and
neglected children (substantiated reports). See id. at 4. The report also noted
that reports of harm increased nearly 100% between 1989 and 1995, and added
that while reports of harm increased slightly between FY94 and FY95, the num-
ber of children involved decreased slightly. See id. at 12-13.
79. Forty-eight per cent were male and 51% were female. An exception was
the Southeast Regional Office, where only 43% were male and 56% were female.
In the other two offices, the numbers split about 50/50. See id.
80. Note that these percentages were somewhat different from the FY92 fig-
ures, with more Natives and fewer Caucasians, others and unknowns. The data-
base may have been slightly different, or the differences could reflect more accu-
rate descriptions of ethnicity in FY95. By region, the primary ethnicities were the
following: Northern Region, 71% Alaskan Native/American Indian, 5% African-
American, 21% Caucasian; Southcentral Region, 32% Alaskan Native/American
Indian, 8% African-American, 47% Caucasian; and Southeast Region, 44%
Alaskan Native/American Indian, 1% African-American, 43% Caucasian, and
8% unknown. Each region also had small percentages of Hispanic, Asian and
other ethnicities.
81. See DFYS FY 1994 & 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 53.
82. Fifty-two percent were female and 48% were male. See id. at 49, 53.
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ports of harm were school ageY
B. State Investigation into Reports of Harm
Case files from 1989 through 1995 showed that a case typically
opened when DFYS received a report of harm to a child. The so-
cial worker taking the call decided when the report should be in-
vestigated, using a form that helped determine the immediacy and
severity of the danger to the child. For example, workers desig-
nated as Priority One those cases presenting the greatest danger to
the child and requiring an emergency response; intake workers re-
sponded to Priority One cases within twenty-four hours.
The purpose of an investigation is to assess the validity of the
report of harm. If the worker's investigation validated the report
of harm, the worker then decided whether the child was a child in
need of aid as that term is defined in the statute.' Upon deciding
that a child was in need of aid, federal law requires the worker also
to consider whether services could reasonably be offered to the
family that would avoid removing the child from the home." The
social worker alternatively could intervene by taking emergency
custody or by taking some other action to ensure the child's
safety.6
In some instances, a child was alleged to have suffered what
could be characterized as criminal neglect or abuseY In approxi-
mately 20% of the cases statewide, one or both parents had been
charged with a crime against the child or a crime for which the
parent was incarcerated leaving the child without an adequate le-
83. Twenty-nine percent were six to 10 years old, 21% were 11 to 14 years
old, and 10% were 15 to 17 years old. See id. at 49, 53. Nationwide, 39% of
abused or neglected children are ages six to 12, as compared to 37% of the overall
population of children. Only 21% of the abused or neglected children are ages 13
and older, as compared to 30% of the overall population. See CHILD WELFARE
LEAGUE OF AMERICA, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECr: A LOOK AT THE STATES 16
fig. 1.6 (1995). The child abuse and neglect rate is 36.6 children per 1,000 children
in the population. The median rate is 14.3 children per 1,000 children in the
population. See id.
84. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2) (Michie 1996).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994).
86. According to DFYS policy, the worker should base the decision to take
emergency custody on the "assessment that there is risk or potential for further
risk to the child if left in the home without immediate action by the worker to
protect the child." DFYS Policy 2.0, § 2.3 (Intake).
87. Occasionally, the child was alleged to have perpetrated a crime, but in in-
vestigating, DFYS decided that the child's home environment would lead to a




gal care giver." The data did not indicate what percentage of
CINA cases could have been charged and handled by the criminal
justice system instead.
Interviews with several respondents suggested that social
workers' responses to reports of harm varied somewhat by loca-
tion." For example, in the past two years, social workers in Bethel
have emphasized early, informal interventions that did not involve
taking custody (for example, sending the child to stay with a rela-
tive or working out a "Care and Safety" plan with the parents),
while those in Anchorage may have taken custody in similar situa-
tions. The social worker's decision either to take custody or inter-
vene in some other way affected the court system directly, since
the court opens cases only if the state assumes custody of a child.
When the worker decided to take custody, the most common
reason was abuse; 30% of case records cited abuse as the reason
for removal of the children. Other reasons included abandonment
(15%), neglect (14%) and parental intoxication (13%).Y If the
worker took emergency custody but could not talk to the parents,
he or she might leave a short brochure describing how DFYS had
taken the child, how to reach them, and what would happen next.
Sometimes, the social worker later brought the child back to
the parents or took emergency custody but let the child stay with
the parents. 1 More often, the social worker either took the child
to a temporary group home or notified foster parents that a child
needed care and then took the child directly to that homey
88. This percentage varied somewhat among locations. For example, in
Bethel, 31% of the cases involved criminal charges against the father, compared
to 15% of cases in Sitka and Fairbanks. Cases involving criminal charges against
the mother were much less frequent, constituting only about 3% of cases state-
wide.
89. DFYS policies on emergency custody (section 2.3) and emergency cus-
tody/decision making (section 2.3.1) apply to all offices statewide. However, the
policies seem to leave legitimate room for interpretation and worker discretion.
90. Although data revealed that the reason given varied by community, fur-
ther review of DFYS files would be necessary to show whether the differences
were related to actual differences in the types of parental problems in each area,
or simply to differences in the ways that the social workers reported the reasons.
91. When DFYS assumes emergency custody, DFYS "through the social
worker will exercise authority in decisions concerning the child's welfare until the
matter may be presented to the court, regardless of whether there is also place-
ment." DFYS Policy 2.3 (Emergency Custody).
92. Often children were separated from siblings, at least temporarily, and had
little or nothing of their own-not their clothes, toys, books or accustomed foods,
nor friends, neighbors, school or opportunity to speak with relatives or family.
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C. The Temporary Custody Hearing93
At the temporary custody hearing, which is required by state
statute and CINA Rule 10, the court determines whether probable
cause exists to believe that the child is a child in need of aid as de-
fined by Alaska Statutes section 47.10.010(a). If DFYS has re-
moved the child from the home, the court also determines whether
DFYS made reasonable efforts under the circumstances to prevent
or eliminate the need for removal and to make it possible for the
child to return home. 4 The temporary custody hearing must occur
within forty-eight hours of taking emergency custody.
Court rules require the state to serve notice of the petition
and hearing on all parties, including the parents and the GAL
within a reasonable time before the hearing." CINA Rule 10 also
requires the state to Make diligent efforts to locate the parties and
give them actual, prior notice of the time and place of the initial
hearing. Interview and court observation data suggested that in
some instances (for example, when the hearing was continued to
another day) the state did not send formal notice to these parties.
One assistant attorney general ("AG") explained that the rules did
not require notice of the date and time of the next hearing be-
cause, technically, the next hearing was merely a continuation of
the earlier hearing. However, several respondents pointed out that
this practice made it difficult for them to participate in the case.
Insufficient efforts by the state to locate and notify absent, unin-
volved or putative fathers at this early hearing may have set the
tone for efforts later in the case, too. Interviews revealed that fail-
ure to locate parents early caused serious and damaging delays
later on in several cases. For example, in 1995, the Citizens' Foster
Care Review Panel located and notified seven fathers who had
been unaware of their child's whereabouts. Two of them had been
93. Depending on the community and the circumstances of the case, this first
hearing may be referred to as a temporary custody hearing, an emergency hear-
ing, or a probable cause hearing. (CINA Rule 10, and this report, refer to it as a
temporary custody hearing.) If a magistrate or district court judge held a tempo-
rary custody hearing, another hearing would be set before a superior court judge
at the earliest opportunity.
94. If DFYS has removed an Indian child from the home, the court must
make findings about DFYS's efforts to comply with ICWA placement prefer-
ences. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 10(c)(4)(B).
95. National guidelines call for the hearing to occur within 72 hours. See
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOURCE
GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACrICE IN CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES
30 (1995) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDELINES].
96. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 7(b) and (c). Notice must also be served on the
Indian tribe if the case involves an Indian child. See id.
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regularly paying child support through the Alaska Child Support
Enforcement DivisionY. Failure to locate and notify parents pre-
vented reunification efforts, left children in foster homes when
they could have been with a parent and delayed termination pro-
ceedings as to the newly found parent.
At the temporary custody hearing, the social worker, repre-
sented by an assistant AG specializing in children's cases, ap-
peared in court before a judge or master. Depending on the com-
munity, the parents might have appeared at this hearing,
sometimes without attorneys. In Anchorage, attorneys for the
parents typically attended the hearing, as did the GAL." The child
rarely appeared. 99
A common feature of these and other CINA hearings was that
they often did not start on time. Waiting for one or more of the
parties to arrive in the courtroom or troubl6 reaching a party by
phone delayed many hearings.
At the temporary custody hearing, the judge usually ap-
pointed a GAL to represent the child's interests,10 appointed at-
torneys for the parents0 1 and set a time for the next hearing. Court
observations revealed that the judges rarely addressed the parents
directly in this or any other hearing. Most temporary custody
hearings were short, uncontested proceedings."n A respondent
from southeast Alaska explained that few parents objected to
97. See CITIZENS' REvIEw PANEL FOR PERMANENCY PLANNING, 1996
ANNUAL REPORT 18 (1996) [hereinafter CRP 1996 ANNUAL REPORT]. The CRP
does not review cases until they are at least six months old.
98. Anchorage was unique in appointing GALs before the temporary custody
hearing. Other communities appointed the GAL at or after the temporary cus-
tody hearing.
99. Numerous respondents said they thought a child's presence at CINA
hearings was destructive to the parent-child relationship.
100. CINA Rule 11(a) mandates the appointment of a GAL in every case.
GALS were appointed in most, but not all, cases. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 11(a).
101. Typically, each parent had an attorney, rather than one attorney repre-
senting the interests of both parents. The study did not collect data about how
often the judge actually appointed an attorney. A parent's attorney may not have
appeared in court if the case was brief.
102. In Alaska, most temporary custody hearings lasted between five and 15
minutes. National guidelines recommend that the court allot a minimum of 60
minutes for each emergency custody hearing. See RESOURCE GUIDELINES, supra
note 95, at 42. The Guidelines also recommend that the court make the emer-
gency custody hearing "as thorough and meaningful as possible." Id. at 30. By
thoroughly exploring all issues at the emergency custody hearing, the court can
"resolve and dismiss some cases on the spot, move quickly on some pretrial issues
... encourage early settlement of the case, encourage prompt delivery of services
to the family, and monitor agency casework at a critical stage of the case." Id. at
31.
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DFYS having custody of the child for ninety days longer, and the
parents were permitted to state any objections to the petition on
the record. A Fairbanks respondent said that parents in that
community often consented to continued state custody without
admitting the allegations in the petition. At the temporary custody
hearing, the parent's attorney might agree to a probable cause
finding but ask the judge to place the child in the home, with state
supervision, instead of in foster care. Some Anchorage temporary
custody hearings took from two to five months to complete. 03 In-
terview data suggested that these were contested temporary cus-
tody hearings."" Several factors seemed to cause contested hear-
ings to take longer to complete. One cause was unavailability of
court time, since the Anchorage children's court calendar was not
structured to allow time for many long hearings. 5 A second cause
was large caseloads which made it difficult for attorneys to pre-
pare. A third cause, at least in Anchorage, was unavailability of
discovery information about the case.
In all locations, judges typically found probable cause to be-
lieve that the child was a child in need of aid. In some cases, the
judges also made specific findings that DFYS had made
"reasonable efforts" under the circumstances to keep the child in
the home; however, the frequency with which judges made the
"reasonable efforts" findings varied somewhat by community. A
Fairbanks respondent reported that some judges in that commu-
nity did not make reasonable efforts findings at the temporary cus-
tody hearing, or only did so if the case was contested. A Bethel re-
spondent said that the court normally did not inquire into
reasonable efforts at the temporary custody hearing because they
already were laid out in the petition. When contesting a temporary
custody petition, a parent's attorney might argue that the child was
not a child in need of aid as defined in the statute. GALs or par-
103. In January of 1996, the Anchorage children's court implemented new pro-
cedures for calendaring and review of CINA proceedings designed, among other
things, to reduce the number of times contested probable cause hearings must be
continued.
104. Interviewees' estimates for the time it took to complete the typical con-
tested probable cause hearing included two weeks, six weeks and one month after
removal.
105. Interviewees generally agreed that scheduling a hearing longer than an
hour was very difficult. One respondent noted that the masters at the Anchorage
children's court sometimes worked through the lunch hour to give the parties the
time they needed. A Fairbanks respondent noted a similar lack of court calendar
time for contested hearings, but said that those scheduling problems prevented
her from contesting emergency hearings that she otherwise might. If the child
were likely to return home within a week or so, there was little point in calendar-
ing a contested hearing three to five days hence.
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ents' attorneys (particularly those in Anchorage) also might argue
at this hearing that DFYS did not do enough to keep the children
in the home.'
D. Pre-Adjudication Review Hearings
Court rules require the court to hold a hearing to review an
order for temporary custody or supervision not more than ninety
days after the initial custody hearing, and every ninety days there-
after.'O' The rule does not explain the purpose of the hearing, nor
does it require the judge to make any findings or take any action.
The ninety-day court reviews probably were intended to resemble
status hearings for the case. As a matter of practice, however,
these review hearings were the most frequent events in most cases
that this project reviewed. A typical CINA court case contained
an order for temporary custody, log notes from multiple ninety-
day review hearings, and a dismissal, with no record of adjudica-
tion or disposition.'O' Thus, the temporary custody and ninety-day
review hearings were, for most cases, the only times that the judge
saw the case.
According to survey data, custodial parents received notice of
review hearings most of the time, but not always. Non-custodial
parents received notice less frequently. Foster parents and chil-
dren received notice least frequently. '09
For cases that were dismissed before adjudication (the major-
ity of cases), multiple ninety-day review hearings often occurred
between the temporary custody hearing and dismissal. Similarly,
cases that went to adjudication also progressed through multiple
ninety-day review hearings before adjudication. An exception was
Sitka, where respondents said the judge expected the parties to be
prepared at the first ninety-day review hearing either to stipulate
to adjudication or to request an adjudication hearing. Many re-
spondents believed that the Anchorage court held too many short,
routine review hearings. They complained that even short court
106. Parties refer to this as pursuing a "no reasonable efforts" finding. A judi-
cial finding that DFYS did not make reasonable efforts in a case could lead to a
federal denial of funds for that child's foster care, but would not deprive the court
of jurisdiction.
107. See ALAsKA R. CINA P. 10(d)(1).
108. Fairbanks cases seldom contained orders of dismissal or any other indica-
tion that a case had closed. Typically, the case contained an expired temporary
custody order.
109. In cases involving an Indian child, attorneys and GALs thought that tribes
received notice more often than non-custodial parents, but less often than custo-
dial parents. DFYS workers believed that tribes received notice much more of
the time than the attorneys and GALs believed that the tribes received notice.
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hearings consumed at least an hour of the parties' time, since
hearings often started about thirty minutes late. 1
Case file data showed that court review hearings typically ran
for about five to ten minutes on the record, while respondents to a
written survey questionnaire estimated that they lasted signifi-
cantly longer." The two findings are not inconsistent, however,
because the court probably was on the record for less time than
parties and participants actually were waiting or were in the court-
room.
Court observations suggested that in a typical review hearing
the AG gave the status of the case, followed by the GAL, tribe (if
any) and parents or parents' attorneys. The parties sometimes
used these reviews to raise matters that they had not been able to
resolve, such as visitation, discovery, parental signing of releases
and scheduling of future hearings. However, observations tended
to confirm that parties seldom used these review hearings to dis-
cuss larger issues of case planning. A respondent in Anchorage
felt that few of the court review hearings were meaningful.
A second type of pre-adjudication review, the Interim Case
Conference ("ICC"), occurs only in Anchorage. The Anchorage
children's court requires parties to meet outside the courtroom
thirty days after probable cause to believe that the child is in need
of aid has been established. The purpose of the review is to bring
the parties together to discuss the case status and plan for the fu-
ture. At least two respondents complained about the ICC re-
quirement. A social worker thought that repeated ICCs consume
a lot of time (one and a half to two hours each). An assistant AG
complained about the time required to attend the meeting and
then fill out the court form.
E. Adjudication Hearings
The adjudication hearing is a trial to the court at which DFYS
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is a
child in need of aid."13 If DFYS has removed the child from the
home, it also must show that under the circumstances of the case
reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for
removal and to make it possible for the child to return home."' In
110. An Anchorage GAL estimated that she spent four days a week in court
and, on average, two to three hours a week waiting for hearings.
111. Attorneys thought that, on average, hearings lasted about 15 minutes,
DFYS workers estimated 22 minutes, and GALs thought 25 minutes.
112. In Anchorage, parties are required by the court to arrive 30 minutes be-
fore the hearing.
113. See ALAsKA R. GINAP. 15(c).
114. See id. 10(c)(4).
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other words, adjudication provides the legal or jurisdictional basis
for state intervention into a family."' The adjudication outcome
controls whether the state may continue to intervene over the ob-
jections of the parents."6
This assessment analyzed the number of CINA cases that pro-
gressed to adjudication, the length of time that elapsed before the
adjudication hearings and the conduct of the adjudication hearings.
Although the data revealed significant differences among commu-
nities on all these variables, they showed that less than half of the
CINA cases filed statewide ever progressed to adjudication.
Moreover, if a case did progress to adjudication, months often
elapsed between the temporary custody hearing and the adjudica-
tion hearing.
1. Frequency of Adjudication Hearings. With the exception
of Bethel cases, the temporary custody hearing was the last
significant step in most of the CINA cases reviewed. An average
of 54% of CINA cases filed statewide involved children who never
were adjudicated children in need of aid. The National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges' Resource Guidelines explain
why early and accurate adjudicatory findings of abuse and neglect
are important: "[They] should be the benchmark against which
later case progress is measured. Adjudicatory findings are the
basis for the case plan and later are equally important to case
review. The case plan should address the real dangers or abuse or
neglect which necessitated court intervention.' ' . The case file
data showed that only Bethel approached the Guideline's
recommendation of making adjudicatory findings of abuse or
neglect in each CINA case."' This shortcoming could have
affected the quality of case review and the quality of the case plan
in the other three communities.
115. See RESOURCE GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 46.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 47.
118. In many instances, the case files did not contain a distinct order of adjudi-
cation. The adjudication finding sometimes took the form of a stipulation, ap-
peared in the disposition order, appeared in the interim disposition order or was
noted in an order terminating parental rights. Because the differing practices
made it difficult to analyze the data meaningfully, the staff created a new vari-
able. The new variable examined each case to see whether the case had at least
one order titled "adjudication," "interim disposition," "disposition" or
"termination of parental rights." If the case had at least one of these orders, it
was categorized for this analysis as a case in which formal adjudication had oc-
curred. The assistant AG or DFYS worker may have filed a petition for adjudica-
tion in more cases, but the analysis included only cases that had a signed order of
adjudication, interim disposition, disposition or termination of parental rights.
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This assessment sought to understand the factors associated
with adjudication. One factor affecting likelihood of adjudication
was case length. Cases that stayed open longer tended to have
more adjudications than cases that were closed quickly. Never-
theless, a significant number of cases statewide (particularly in An-
chorage) lasted a year or more without ever progressing to adjudi-
cation. Thirty-nine per cent (N=9) of the Anchorage cases that
were closed in twelve to eighteen months did not have either an
adjudication or disposition, and 25% (N=2) of the Anchorage
cases that were closed in eighteen to twenty-four months never had
an adjudication of CINA or a disposition order.
Whether a case progressed to adjudication also depended to a
large degree on where the case was filed. Excluding Bethel cases
from the equation, only 38% of CINA cases filed in Anchorage,
Sitka and Fairbanks involved children who were formally adjudi-
cated children in need of aid. In contrast, 78% of the CINA cases
filed in Bethel were formally adjudicated. Although no respon-
dents interviewed for this study offered strong explanations for this
disparity between Bethel and the three other communities, they
suggested several theories. Some said that the neglect and abuse
allegations underlying Bethel CINA petitions were either "worse"
or easier to prove in court than those underlying Anchorage peti-
tions. Others thought that a difference in social worker response
explained the disparity. During the past two years, social workers
in Bethel focused on informal, preventative work with troubled
parents, tending to take custody only after previous, documented
attempts to help had failed. Under this theory, cases coming be-
fore the Bethel judge involved parents who already had a track re-
cord of failure, as opposed to cases from Anchorage or the other
communities, where parents had not received similar services. At-
torneys and social workers in Bethel thus might have been more
willing to take cases to adjudication, and parents' attorneys might
have had fewer arguments with which to oppose them than in
other locations.119 However, many of the Bethel cases reviewed
had opened between 1989 and 1994, and the hypothesis does not
explain the disparity in those cases.
Respondents also pointed to the Bethel court's policy of
scheduling cases for adjudication within sixty to ninety days of the
temporary custody hearing and its habit of devoting one day a
week to CINA cases. These practices encouraged the parties to
move the cases along. Yet none of these theories seems to explain
such a large disparity)1
119. This theory does not necessarily explain adjudication rates in Sitka or
Fairbanks.
120. The Sitka court adjudicated most (70%) of its cases within four months, as
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2. Timing of Adjudication Hearings. Neither Alaska law nor
Alaska court rules set a deadline for when adjudication should
occur. The National Guidelines suggest that "[c]ourt rules or
guidelines need to specify a time limit within which the
adjudication must be completed. 12' The Guidelines recommend,
based on experience in many jurisdictions, that the adjudication
occur within sixty days after removal of the child.'2
Perhaps because state law sets no deadline, months often
elapsed before a case progressed to adjudication. The data reveal
that all but five (83%) of the adjudication or disposition orders en-
tered in Sitka's cases were entered within the first six months of
the case, while in Anchorage only 41% were entered within that
time. In Fairbanks, 58% of the cases containing an adjudication or
disposition had progressed to that point within 180 days, compared
to 64% in Bethel.
A more detailed analysis of the data again indicates significant
differences among court locations in the amount of time cases took
to progress to adjudication. For example, the bulk of Anchorage
cases containing an adjudication took between six and twelve
months, while 30% of Sitka's cases took less than sixty days and
70% took four months or less. In Bethel, only 3% of the cases
progressed to adjudication in less than sixty days while more than
60% took between two and six months. Fairbanks data are very
similar, with 5% of the cases reaching adjudication in less than
sixty days and the bulk of the cases taking between two and twelve
months. The data suggest that only Sitka approached the National
Resource Guidelines' goal of adjudication within sixty days after
removal of the child, as no court except Sitka adjudicated more
than a handful of cases within sixty days.
Local practice and expectation significantly affected the tim-
ing of adjudication hearings. For example, in Sitka the judge ex-
pected DFYS to be ready to adjudicate ninety days after taking
custody, and in southeast Alaska, judges set the adjudication for
two to four weeks from the date of the first ninety-day review
compared to 29% for Bethel. If setting cases early explained the high rate of ad-
judication in Bethel, then Sitka should have had more adjudications than Bethel.
The Bethel adjudication disparity certainly was at least partly related to the find-
ing that ICWA cases were significantly more likely than non-ICWA cases to con-
tain adjudications, because Bethel was unique in having a caseload composed al-
most completely of ICWA cases (only two of Bethel's 98 cases were non-ICWA,
as compared to the other three communities whose caseloads were about 70%
non-ICWA).
121. RESOURCE GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 47.
122. See id. The Guidelines recommend against exceptions except in cases in-
volving newly discovered evidence, unavoidable delays in the notification of par-
ties and unforeseen personal emergencies. See id.
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hearing.'3 In Anchorage, on the other hand, attorneys and social
workers estimated that adjudication typically took ten to twelve
months (occasionally because the preceding stage of probable
cause had so often stretched to four or five months). Although the
Anchorage court recently initiated changes designed to move cases
more quickly, the court still anticipates 180 days before adjudica-
tion. In Fairbanks, DFYS routinely asked for short periods of cus-
tody (sixty to ninety days). During that time, one or more review
hearings but no adjudication occurred.'24 In Bethel, the judge
normally set cases for adjudication thirty to sixty days after the ini-
tial custody hearing, far earlier than other communities; however,
hearings often were continued, with the result that very few were
adjudicated within sixty days. In some communities, DFYS rou-
tinely asked for six months of temporary custody, and took about
that long before going to the adjudication hearing.
Many respondents reported frustration with slow progress to
adjudication and recommended shorter time frames. In Anchor-
age, respondents (but not parents' attorneys) recommended that
adjudication occur within thirty or forty-five days after the tempo-
rary custody hearing. Judges recommended forty-five to ninety
days; social workers, an experienced foster parent and a number of
attorneys (not parents' attorneys) suggested thirty days. A Fair-
banks respondent thought that adjudications should be treated less
like "scheduling problems," since children were being kept out of
their homes.
3. Reasons for Delayed Hearings. In cases for which
adjudication was delayed, interview data suggested that the main
causes were untimely notification of absent parents, attempts to
get parents into treatment or better situations, attorneys' efforts to
obtain information about the case or administrative delays (for
example, transfer between social workers). A Fairbanks
respondent mentioned scheduling difficulties as a factor delaying
adjudication hearings, and a Bethel respondent thought that as
many as half of the cases set for adjudication were continued
because the attorneys had been unable to contact their clients.
Another important factor affecting the timing of adjudication
hearings was whether they were contested. About a third of the
123. Sitka cases moved to adjudication far more quickly than cases in any of
the other communities studied.
124. Several Fairbanks respondents were skeptical that adjudication could or
should occur any sooner than 90 days after removal. They cited the usual reasons
that DFYS could not be ready any sooner: that parents would not have time to
engage in the case plan, that attorneys' schedules were too complicated and that it
might set up an adversarial system that would unnecessarily prevent stipulations.
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attorneys surveyed said that contested adjudication hearings
"often" or "usually" had to be rescheduled for another day.
4. Parties. The National Resource Guidelines suggest that all
parties who have been located and served and their attorneys
should attend the adjudication hearing, even if it is uncontested, so
they can defend the stipulation and answer the judge's questions.'2
Although adjudication hearings were relatively infrequent, the
data revealed that the parents, their attorneys, the social worker,
the assistant AG and the GAL all might attend the adjudication
hearing."' In some cases, some or most of the parties spent a few
minutes before the hearing discussing the case. In some instances,
it may have been the only time that the attorneys talked to their
clients. If other scheduled matters delayed the hearing, the
participants may have had a few extra minutes in which to confer.
In many courts, the meetings took place in the hallway or lobby
near the courtroom. 2I Also, not every party participated in these
meetings, particularly parties from outside the area, such as tribal
representatives.'2
5. Length of Hearings. The Resource Guidelines
recommend that the court allot a minimum of thirty minutes for
each uncontested adjudication hearing.1 29 The Guidelines allot ten
minutes for testimony from the caseworker, parents and other
witnesses in support of the stipulation, five minutes to discuss the
service plan, five minutes for troubleshooting and negotiations
between parties, and five minutes to issue orders and schedule
subsequent hearings. Many adjudication hearings lasted only five
or ten minutes1 O
125. See RESOURCE GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 49.
126. In cases involving an Indian child, a tribal representative might also at-
tend the adjudication hearing.
127. For example, such meetings took place in Fairbanks, Bethel and Anchor-
age. Some parties said that the waiting time in Fairbanks could not be spent pro-
ductively because the hallways did not offer enough privacy to talk about cases.
128. In Bethel, the assistant AG sometimes spent a few minutes in the hallway
between hearings conferring with the social worker, but not necessarily with the
parents, their attorneys, the GAL or the tribal representative.
129. See RESOURCE GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 51.
130. For example, in one case observed in Anchorage, the judge adjudicated a
child CINA who had been in state custody over one year, and because the case
lacked a permanent plan, ordered the social worker and AG supervisors to attend
an interim case conference. This hearing lasted three minutes. In a ten-minute
Fairbanks adjudication hearing, the attorney of a parent who had not come to the
hearing requested a continuance but the judge adjudicated the child CINA after
reviewing a written offer of proof from the AG.
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6. Content of Hearings. Interviews suggested that most
adjudications were stipulated. Only occasionally did attorneys ask
witnesses to testify, present experts or challenge proposed
agreements or actions. Also at the adjudication hearing, the judge
might have inquired briefly about the "reasonable efforts" made to
reunite the family." Data suggested, however, that the inquiry
usually was not substantial. For example, only about one-third of
the judges who responded to a written survey reported that when
they made written reasonable efforts findings, they "often" or
"usually" addressed services and help given to the family. Only
37% of these judges reported "often" or "usually" addressing the
sufficiency and appropriateness of the services.
On the other hand, the adjudication hearings that were con-
tested lasted for a few hours or up to a week. Another interviewee
said contested hearings could span three days. Because they in-
volved so many parties, contested hearings could consume signifi-
cant state resources.
F. The Disposition
After a child has been adjudicated CINA, the court holds a
disposition hearing. The purpose of the hearing is to determine
the child's longer-term placement. The court rules require that the
disposition hearing occur either at the same time as the adjudica-
tion or "without unreasonable delay" after the adjudication." In
some communities, the court held the disposition hearing at the
same time as the adjudication. 4 Often the parties agreed to a dis-
131. Court observations in Anchorage suggested that discussion of reasonable
(or active) efforts consumed very little court time. The AG typically summarized
services the family was receiving during the initial statement to the court, and the
court then made verbal reasonable efforts findings as a matter of course. In the
Fairbanks adjudication hearing discussed in the previous footnote, discussion of
reasonable efforts consumed no more than one minute of court time. In Bethel,
however, a respondent suggested that the parents' attorney was more likely to
contest the reasonable efforts finding at adjudication than at the initial custody
hearing.
132. The state pays the salaries of the judge, court employees, social worker,
assistant AG, GAL and usually an attorney for each parent as well. In one par-
ticularly complex case, the judge estimated that the total state resources
(including the foster care payments, parents' and children's treatment and coun-
seling, attorneys, social worker salaries, and so on) devoted to the case over a pe-
riod of several years exceeded $1 million.
133. See ALAsKA R. CINA P. 17(a).
134. The adjudication and disposition hearings occurred together at the fol-
lowing rates: Fairbanks, 10%, or four of the 39 cases; Sitka, 33% or nine of the 30
cases; Anchorage, 42% or 31 of the 73 cases; and Bethel, 59% or 45 of the 76
cases. These figures again show how differently each community handles CINA
1997]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
position ahead of time, and the court approved it at the end of the
adjudication hearing. In communities that did not hold these
hearings at the same time, however, months often elapsed between
them. Respondents identified one source of disposition hearing
delay as waiting for a psychological evaluation or other services. A
Bethel respondent reported that the judge sets disposition hearings
for sixty days after adjudication and that delays rarely occurred at
that stage. However, when they did occur, delays often resulted
from parents who could not be located or from changes in the case
plan.'35
Court rules require DFYS to file a pre-disposition report ten
days before the disposition hearing. The GAL also usually files a
written pre-disposition report with the court, although the GAL's
report is not required. Bethel and Fairbanks respondents said that
in some cases reports were not timely filed and the parties did not
see them until the day of the hearing. The parent and the parent's
attorney then had to discuss the report in the courtroom before the
hearing or ask to delay the hearing.
A number of disposition options were available to the court
after adjudication.136 If the child had not returned home by the
time of disposition, the case plan often called for six to twelve
months of treatment for the parent. If the treatment worked or
the family became stable, DFYS sent the children back to the par-
ents.
Other more permanent disposition options included termina-
tion of parental rights or voluntary relinquishment of rights. Ter-
mination eliminates parental rights to visit, communicate and ob-
tain information about the child, as well as taking away the
parents' legal rights to decide about the child's education and
health. It deprives the child of the chance to return home and
maintain contact with parents and extended family in exchange for
finding a safe and permanent home.' Voluntary relinquishments
have the same legal effect as terminations of parental rights, but
are arrived at without a contested trial.
Although terminations and voluntary relinquishments were
relatively uncommon dispositions, this report discusses them sepa-
rately because they often were complex and consumed resources,
and because they had important consequences for children and
cases, differences that cannot be attributed to any major factor other than local
practices that have evolved over a period of years. These data do not include
cases that involved a termination of parental rights.
135. This respondent cited the example of a case in which the original plan was
reunification, but the parent subsequently was sentenced to an extended prison
term, necessitating a new look at the case plan.
136. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080 (Michie 1996).
137. See RESOURCE GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 88.
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parents. Only thirty-eight cases contained a termination of paren-
tal rights (or 19% of all cases containing an adjudication or disposi-
tion statewide). Parents voluntarily relinquished rights to their
children in thirty-four cases statewide (or 17% of all cases con-
taining an adjudication or disposition statewide). The Resource
Guidelines explain that delaying or deferring termination of paren-
tal rights can create serious problems for children: "Time frames
and continuances that seem reasonable to adults... are unaccept-
able when a child's right to permanence is at stake .... When
termination decisions are deferred or delayed, a child's emotional
problems may worsen and the child may become more difficult to
place."138
Data suggested that delays sometimes occurred before termi-
nation trials. Respondents told of cases in which the threat of im-
minent termination hearings pushed parents into treatment or oth-
erwise into taking the actions that DFYS had required all along.
Then the court authorized a further extension of custody to give
the parents the chance to rehabilitate themselves and the family
environment. If these efforts did not work, another several months
had elapsed.
A second source of delay involved the need to notify absent
parents'39 or to wait for pending (criminal) court cases to move to
completion. Anchorage respondents especially complained of de-
lays in termination cases. Respondents reported that these delays
most often were caused by calendaring difficulties (one respondent
said that calendar call dates for termination petitions are five
months later), delays in adopting termination as a case plan, heavy
caseloads and failure to notify absent parents. '
Of particular concern were delays in termination trials caused
by failure to locate and notify absent parents. While this problem
did not occur with great frequency, when it did occur it created
damaging and unnecessary delays for children. If the court and
parties learned that one or more putative parents had not been no-
tified after the case already had been set for termination, the ter-
mination would be delayed. An AG said that, absent significant
138. Id.
139. Sometimes, the termination trial date became the focus for parental no-
tices that perhaps should have happened years earlier. In one case reviewed, a
father who had been paying child support since his daughter was two, with no op-
portunity to see her, was notified when she was ten (and had been in and out of
foster care for many of the intervening eight years) that the state wanted to ter-
minate his parental rights. He had not known that she was in foster care, and said
that he wanted to have her live with him. Had the state notified him years earlier,




progress by the parents toward changing the circumstances that
caused removal, the parties should aim for earlier permanency
planning by terminating parental rights within six months of re-
moval.
G. Post-Disposition Reviews
Court rules and state and federal law require two court re-
views: the annual review (to review the disposition order) and the
eighteen-month permanency planning hearing (to review the
placement plan, usually post-disposition)."4 Other than these re-
quired reviews, the court played little post-disposition role in the
cases.
1. Annual Review. The annual review, required by state law
and court rule, is normally a paper review at which the judge
determines whether the child continues to be a child in need of aid
and whether continued custody or supervision by DFYS is in the
child's best interests.' Court rule and state statute require the
court to make certain further findings if the child is not returned
home."'42 Approaches to the annual review requirement varied
somewhat by court location. In Sitka, DFYS requested annual
review, which was combined with the eighteen-month permanency
planning hearing.43 A Sitka respondent estimated that annual
reviews occurred about fourteen to sixteen months after the state
had taken custody. In Anchorage, the children's court secretary
wrote the case name and number on an index card and manually
filed it to be "tickled" a year later. The court did not initiate the
review, but sent a monthly list to DFYS. The master read the
social worker's annual review report and scheduled hearings only
for those cases in which the case plan had changed or no
permanent plan was in place.'" In Fairbanks, judges started to
140. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 19(a), (d); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(f), (1)
(Michie 1996).
141. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 19(a), (d); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(0.
142. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 19(d) (applying ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c),
(0; 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15), (16) (1994)). The further findings concern whether
reasonable efforts have been made to return the child to the home, what services
the parents have used and what other services they need, what services a child
reaching age sixteen needs for a transition to independent living, and whether
there is a case plan in effect either to return the child home, place the child for
adoption or guardianship or continue in foster care on a long-term basis. See id.
19(d).
143. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(0 permits the court to postpone the annual re-
view until the time set for the permanency planning review if the two hearings
would arise 90 days apart.
144. The master noted that previous attempts to hold hearings in every case at
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hold annual review hearings in 1995. One judge who held hearings
scheduled them for fifteen minutes unless the parties requested
more time. One respondent described the hearings as "often
perfunctory" and "often uncontested based on what the social
worker wrote in the report." Another agreed that they were
normally not contested. In Bethel, the court recently began to set
annual reviews at the disposition hearing.
With respect to annual review reports, one judge reported that
DFYS and GAL reports frequently were "never filed."1'5 Another
judge agreed but described lack of reports as an "irritation" that
did not significantly affect case progress. A public defender said
that the reports began coming in late a few years ago and were be-
coming less and less timely.
2. Permanency Planning Review. In an effort to promote the
goal of permanence for abused and neglected children, state and
federal law contain requirements that encourage social workers
and other parties periodically to step back and make longer-term
plans for children in CINA cases. The permanency planning
hearing is one such requirement. Within eighteen months after the
child is taken into emergency custody or adjudicated a child in
need of aid, the court must hold a hearing to review the placement
and services provided and to determine the child's future status.'46
The court's choices include returning the child to the parent,
keeping the child out of the home for a specified period or on a
permanent or long-term basis or letting DFYS place the child for
adoption or legal guardianship."' The court must make written
findings.' s The federal Adoption Assistance Act schedules this
hearing eighteen months after the child is first placed outside the
home, while state law schedules it eighteen months after
placement or after disposition or termination of parental rights.
149
Until recently, Alaska courts rarely scheduled permanency
planning hearings, possibly because the CINA Rules do not men-
tion them. As with other reviews, courts that did hold permanency
planning hearings approached them in different ways. In Bethel,
the judge began permanency planning hearings about two years
annual review time "overwhelmed" the system.
145. Social workers, but not GALs, are required to file annual review reports.
See ALASKA R. CINA P. 19(a).
146. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080() (applying 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1994)).
147. See id § 47.10.080(l)(1)-(4).
148. See id § 47.10.080(1).
149. See id § 47.10.080(1) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1994)); id. §
47.10.142(h). Note that ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(1) is somewhat inconsistent




ago. At these reviews, the Bethel judge identified a general per-
manency plan, although one respondent said that the judge did not
set deadlines for carrying out the plan. In Fairbanks, most judges
combined the eighteen-month review with the annual review."'
One judge said that the reviews lasted an average of five minutes.
In Sitka, social workers initiated the permanency planning review
by filing the eighteen-month information along with annual review
material. The court held a hearing on the record, after which all
parties negotiated a permanency plan. The meetings took one to
two hours. At least two respondents thought that more emphasis
on permanency planning would benefit cases. One thought that
court hearings would force DFYS to plan for permanency earlier.
A judge remarked that generally judges "only sees pieces" of the
permanency plan.
Another permanency review mechanism is the Citizen's Fos-
ter Care Review Panel ("CRP") which can not make decisions in a
case-it is not even a party to the CINA cases it reviews-but its
reviews are thorough and include notice to all parties. The legisla-
ture created CRPs in 1990. A local CRP exists in Anchorage but
nowhere else; the legislature never funded any other local panels.
The Anchorage panel began work in 1993 by reviewing all An-
chorage DFYS cases filed six months earlier. The panel now re-
views those same cases every six months; however, budget and
staff cuts have prevented the panel from reviewing many new
cases.
151
The Anchorage CRP holds hearings to review its cases.'52
State law requires notice to all interested parties (foster parents,
parents, attorneys, social workers and tribes). Through its notice
practices, the panel has successfully located fathers that DFYS had
listed as "unknown." Some of the fathers were easily located since
they were paying child support through the state child support sys-
tem or were in prison. According to staff, DFYS has "a very poor
record of looking for absent parents." The Anchorage CRP's staff
mentioned months-long delays caused by social worker turnover,
and DFYS's failures to initiate searches until late in the case.
"Eleventh hour conversions" by parents who began treatment at
the "last minute" also caused problems in some of the cases re-
viewed by the panel. According to panel staff, these parents could
have benefited from a clear deadline with clear consequences de-
150. One Fairbanks judge interviewed for this assessment had never seen an 18
month review and had never heard of one being requested.
151. In 1995, the Anchorage panel held 104 reviews involving 76 families and
183 children. See CRP 1996 Annual Report, supra note 97, at 4.
152. The panel submits detailed, written reports to the people involved in the
case, but typically does not submit reports to the court.
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livered early in the case and from DFYS follow-up to help them
comply.
Some parents' attorneys expressed concern about the citizen
review process. First, they perceived it as duplicating other re-
views without adding new information or otherwise improving case
progress. They said that requiring workers to attend one more re-
view consumed time that could better be spent delivering services.
Second, they said because they often did not have time to attend
the citizens' panel hearings, their clients' perspectives were not
adequately represented, resulting in biased reports. Third, they
did not think judges should receive a copy of the CRP report, be-
cause the attorneys were concerned about the reliability of the in-
formation received by the panel."
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides recommendations to improve the way
courts handle child abuse and neglect proceedings. Recommenda-
tions are based on the data and findings set out in Part III.
A. General Principles for Handling CINA Cases
This assessment has led to two preliminary yet vital conclu-
sions. At first glance, these points may seem obvious and not par-
ticularly significant. However, the recommendations have far-
reaching implications and will be extremely difficult to implement.
First, the court system must ensure that CINA proceedings receive
the emphasis that they deserve. Second, the court system must en-
sure that the primary focus of any CINA proceeding always is the
child who is the subject of the proceeding.
In order to ensure that CINA cases receive proper emphasis,
the court system should review directives, court rules and statutes
that set priorities for appellate and trial courts' management of all
types of cases. The court system should also specifically direct ap-
pellate and trial courts to devote sufficient resources to CINA pro-
ceedings. However, a number of factors make it difficult to give
CINA cases the attention they deserve. The statutes, procedures
and rules governing CINA cases appear in a variety of places,
making it difficult for a person unfamiliar with the field to grasp
them quickly. Local practices are complex, and vary so widely
from court to court that attorneys and GALs familiar with practice
in one community cannot easily go to another court. The cases in-
volve so many parties that it is difficult to coordinate the schedules
153. In contrast, a majority of attorneys and GALs who responded to a written




of every person. Although the cases are important, CINA filings
comprise a very small percentage of the court system's total civil
and criminal filings, making it more likely that their importance
will be overlooked. Because they are among the most difficult and
unpleasant cases for judges to handle, few may volunteer to work
with them. Finally, because CINA cases are confidential, people
outside the system often do not know about them or how they are
handled. Courts should recognize that, although CINA cases con-
stitute a small percentage of total filings and require different case
management techniques than other civil cases, their importance
merits the extra effort. Every type of case appears to have priority
for the courts, based on one directive or another. Simply adding
CINA cases to this list will not materially increase the courts' abil-
ity to focus on these cases. Thus, the court system should compre-
hensively review the order of priorities that courts must apply.
In order to ensure that the primary focus of a CINA pro-
ceeding is on the child, courts should treat each CINA case, and
indeed each hearing, as an emergency; from the child's perspective,
it is exactly that. However, this too will be difficult to achieve. As
discussed throughout this Article, CINA cases present frequent
opportunities for conflict among parents' rights, tribes' interests,
institutional interests, and the child's best interests. In a case that
may involve six or more parties, the GAL is the only party who
advocates exclusively for the child's best interest. (Although
DFYS represents the state's interest in protecting children from
harm, it also must work to rehabilitate parents and has its own in-
stitutional interests as well.) The judge is the one participant who
can ensure that the child's interests remain paramount.
While this principle may at first seem obvious and non-
controversial, it is often neither. While all parties stress the impor-
tance of the child's interest, in reality it often falls far down the list
of priorities. The courts, DFYS and the AG's office may place
their own schedules, priorities and needs ahead of the children's,
often due to limited resources. All parties must keep the child's
time frame in their perspective, as well as considering their own
needs and those of their agencies.
Courts, including the supreme court, have at times focused
narrowly on other parties' rights to the practical exclusion of the
interests of the children.M4 This does not mean other parties' rights
(such as the parents) should be ignored or minimized. However,
courts should analyze them in the context of the interests of the
children. Our law creates parental rights, and imposes obligations
154. See Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436, 441 n. 5 (Alaska 1983), where the su-
preme court said that a child's right to a permanent, adequate home is not
"fundamental" for purposes of constitutional analysis.
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on DFYS to provide services to parents, precisely because of a so-
cietal belief that children, as a general rule, fare better with their
parents (at least those who can minimally care for their children)
than in an often impersonal foster care system. The reason for
helping parents is so that they can provide for their children. Thus,
parents' rights must be understood in the context of what is best
for the children.155
B. Proper Role for Judges
The role for judges in CINA proceedings emerged in inter-
views as a primary concern of parties in the CINA system. Many
respondents thought that significant deficiencies in the handling of
CINA cases could be cured if judges would increase the amount of
initiative and effort they exercised. While a few judges adopted a
positive, active role, most saw their proper role as more limited
and passive than the role envisioned by the parties.
Advocates for a passive judicial role pointed out that few
judges have training in this area and it is unreasonable to assume
that most could become experts. Furthermore, most judges do not
have an overall view of the funding limitations at DFYS and other
agencies. What a judge might see as a reasonable and necessary
order might have real and substantial negative consequences for
agency workers. Nevertheless, the federal law and national prac-
tice guidelines clearly envision a much more active role for judges
than they currently take. Judges should actively manage the pace
and substantive progress of CINA cases because "[i]n child welfare
cases, the judge is not merely the arbiter of a dispute placed before
the court, but, rather, sets and repeatedly adjusts the direction for
state intervention on behalf of each abused and neglected child."'56
Nor should judges treat CINA cases the same as other civil
cases in the adversarial system. Because "the law assigns to the ju-
venile court a series of interrelated and complex decisions that
shape the course of state intervention and determine the future of
the child and family," the court must manage CINA litigation
more proactively than other civil litigationY Federal law requires
the judge to be the gatekeeper in CINA cases. As one respondent
pointed out, DFYS may have expertise in child welfare matters,
155. The supreme court acknowledged in one of its earlier child in need of aid
decisions that "in recent years the courts have become increasingly aware of the
rights of children." D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Alaska 1973) (footnote
omitted).
156. RF_SOURCE GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 15. One interviewee noted that
in states in which the child is a ward of the court, judges see their responsibility as
much more directly involving them in the case.
157. Id. at 14.
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but it lacks expertise in court case management. The judge is the
only player in a position to oversee case management and case
progress.
Judges should get CINA cases off on the right track at the
very beginning of the case by ensuring prompt notice to all parties.
The findings showed that notice often did not go to all parties
(absent parents and Indian tribes, especially) early in the case and
that this lack of early notice substantially delayed some cases.
Also, the court should consider requiring the state's attorney to file
an affidavit certifying that all potential parties have been served
with notice and describing the efforts made to locate any parties
who were not served. The court should encourage assistant AGs
and social workers to precede, or. at least supplement, formal no-
tice with direct, informal notice. If a potential party has not been
served, the court should follow-up to make sure the state locates
and serves the individual. Finally, the court should ensure from
the very beginning that DFYS has a plan for the case, and that the
agency and the parents know the court will review their progress.
As a general rule, judges should be assigned early in the case,
and each judge should keep all cases before him or her from start
to finish. 8 The judges should have a direct relationship with each
family and should have a sense of ownership in the case and re-
sponsibility for the children involved. They should invest the time
necessary, both on and off the bench, to gather complete informa-
tion and assess the results of decisions. Also, at the temporary cus-
tody hearing and at other hearings, judges should address the par-
ents directly, and they should impress upon the parents the
seriousness of the matter and should offer to answer questions
about orders or the process.
C. Reasonable Efforts Findings
This assessment found that, as a whole, Alaska's courts com-
plied with the requirement of making reasonable efforts findings at
the various points required by law and court rule. However, these
findings often were part of a stipulated order and were presented
at a brief hearing during which the judicial officer made a minimal
158. The National Resource Guidelines cite a number of benefits from one-
family-one-judge calendaring. A single judge who hears all matters related to a
single family's court experience develops a unique judicial perspective. The judge
develops a long-term perspective that enables him or her to identify patterns of
behavior exhibited over time by all parties, provide consistency and continuity
and make decisions consistent with the best interests of the child. See RESOURCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 19. Court locations that use judge-supervised judi-
cial officers, such as Anchorage, still should maintain the principle of one-family-
one-judge.
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inquiry on the record. By investing only a few more moments in
each hearing, judges could seriously inquire about the state's rea-
sonable efforts, thus laying a foundation for DFYS to devise and,
where necessary, revise the family's case plan. Also, by carefully
reviewing prior DFYS efforts to help the family, "the court can
better evaluate both the danger to the child and the ability of the
family to respond to help.1
159
Judges should learn, to the extent possible, what resources are
available in their communities so they can effectively make rea-
sonable efforts findings. The judge cannot review the agency's ef-
forts to provide services unless the judge knows what is available.
Yet judges often do not know about appropriate treatment serv-
ices, and the available services change rapidly. Thus, the court sys-
tem should educate judges and magistrates about what services are
available to families in their communities and statewide.160 The
court must consider how to keep the judges' knowledge current for
these rapidly changing resources.161
D. Delay/Time Standards
The subject of delay is complex. The CINA system is fraught
with tension between the parties whom delay benefits and those
whom it harms. Although the child's need for stability and finality
weighs in favor of resolving cases quickly, other parties' interests
and caseloads create a system that tolerates delays of months or
even years. Parents' constitutional right to the care and control of
their child, their need for services that may not be immediately
available, and their need for time to come to terms with what they
have to do weigh in favor of delay. The judges' passive manage-
ment styles and lack of time to devote to each individual CINA
case also contribute to tolerance for delay. Large caseloads as-
signed to social workers and assistant AGs in some communities
make them less likely to push hard for a timely resolution in any
one case. Coming to a fair and just resolution may require time for
parties to consider the various choices. The large number of par-
159. Id. at 38. Some jurisdictions use concurrent planning to help balance the
tensions inherent in many foster care cases. In this process, the child welfare
agency plans for reunifying the family, if possible, and simultaneously looks at
realistic permanent placements for the child in case the reunification efforts do
not succeed. Alaska's DFYS is exploring concurrent planning as a possibility for
appropriate cases.
160. See Subsection E, infra, regarding judicial education.
161. Many communities have handbooks of resources that list local social
services agencies, substance abuse treatment, counseling, and a wide range of
other services. These and other resources can be used by judges or parties to as-
sess the local services available for children and families.
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ties also makes some delay inevitable. If a case is appealed, the
pace of appellate proceedings may contribute to additional delay.
A recommendation that everything occur on time simply is
not realistic. Judges and the other actors in the system must wres-
tle with the tensions in almost every case to establish a balance be-
tween speed, fairness and thoroughness. Nevertheless, judges and
parties in courts around the state should take a serious look at pro-
cedures and expectations in speedier locations, such as Sitka. Al-
though some judges and attorneys doubt whether the court can
adjudicate cases quickly, Sitka gives evidence that they can.
The court system should develop comprehensive time stan-
dards for CINA cases, incorporate these time standards in the
CINA Rules, and build them into its computerized case manage-
ment system. Time standards are probably the most important
concrete steps the court system can take to ensure CINA cases re-
ceive the attention they deserve and are processed expeditiously.
The standards should allow the court discretion in exceptional
cases.
At a minimum, time standards should include deadlines for
completing contested temporary custody hearings, setting and
completing adjudication hearings," setting disposition hearings
(when they do not occur immediately after the adjudication hear-
ing) 163 and completing contested termination of parental rights tri-
als. In thinking generally about policies regarding delay, and in
thinking about delay in each individual case, the court and judges
should distinguish between "constructive" delay and "drift" delay.
Constructive delay benefits the child. Drift delay arises when the
case is delayed because of scheduling difficulties, such as waiting
for services of key professionals, including judges, to become
available. The court should consider adopting a rule that encour-
ages promptness.'64
The assessment has shown the timeliness of adjudication
hearings to be a particular concern. Part III discussed the impor-
162. Judges recommended 45-90 days; social workers and a number of attor-
neys (but not parents' attorneys) thought that adjudication could occur within 30
days. The Sitka court adjudicates many cases in about 60 days.
163. Some courts schedule separate adjudication and disposition hearings,
while others hold both at the same time. We take no position on whether they
should occur together, as long as delays between them do not exceed thirty days.
164. Possible language for such a rule might provide the following:
"Rule 1
(g) Avoiding Delay. These Rules will be construed to minimize delay,
because delay in Child in Need of Aid cases directly prejudices the wel-
fare of the involved children."
This language is based on the Children Act, 1989, ch. 41 (Eng.).
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.tance of early and accurate adjudicatory findings of abuse and ne-
glect, and finds that fewer than half of all Alaska CINA cases
statewide ever reach adjudication. If the case cannot be dismissed
within thirty days of the temporary custody hearing, the judge
should set it for adjudication.1 National guidelines recommend,
based on experience in other jurisdictions, that adjudication be
completed within sixty days of removal of the child. Most persons
whom we interviewed (other than parents' attorneys) believed that
most cases should reach adjudication within forty-five to ninety
days. Judges should deny requests to delay adjudication hearings
absent newly discovered evidence, unavoidable delays in notifying
parties, and unforeseen personal emergencies.' Laying out time-
lines for major events, especially adjudication, has a number of
benefits, including reducing the number of preadjudication ninety-
day review hearings, which might well save court hearing time in
the case overall.
Court administration should consider effective case manage-
ment strategies to make more calendar time available for CINA
hearings. Numerous interviewees, particularly those in Anchorage
and Fairbanks, complained about lack of timely access to judges'
and masters' calendars for motions and other hearings, especially
contested hearings.'67 The court also should consider other solu-
tions, including hiring more judges or judicial officers to hear
CINA cases.
The court should institute a pilot project requiring parties to
attend pretrial conferences to see whether these can limit the is-
sues at contested hearings, with less trial time and fewer scheduling
problems. 6' The National Resource Guidelines state that pretrial
conferences often help "to resolve preliminary issues and to arrive
at a time estimate for the hearing."'69 This assessment found that
some scheduling delays occurred because parties overestimated
the amount of time needed for a hearing.70- Because Anchorage
already requires a preadjudication case conference, and because it
165. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges' Resource
Guidelines for improving court practice in child abuse and neglect cases suggest
that "[clourt rules or guidelines need to specify a time limit within which the ad-
judication must be completed." RESOURCE GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 47.
166. See id.
167. We note that only a handful of the 11 Anchorage judges regularly (or
ever) devote calendar time to CINA cases.
168. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 13.
169. RESOURCE GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at 20.
170. Data showed that although few hearings lasted longer than twenty min-
utes, attorneys often requested several hours or days of court time for contested
hearings. Judges then had to look many weeks or months ahead in order to find
the block of time on their calendars.
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has the most CINA filings, it should be designated as the pilot
project site.
E. Other Considerations
The assessment produced a number of further recommenda-
tions. The following highlight several of these recommendations.
First, probably to a greater extent than any other part of our legal
system, the foster care system would benefit from coordination
and cooperation between the involved parties. The courts can do
much to encourage this cooperation. For example, judges could
encourage a non-adversarial tone in CINA cases which would pro-
duce several benefits. Parties may be more willing to stipulate to
key issues than to litigate them. Stipulations can save court hear-
ing time and can achieve outcomes superior to those reached
through litigation. Parents and DFYS may work together to ac-
complish what is best for the child. A judge can encourage a non-
adversarial tone by (1) requiring pre-hearing conferences involving
the GAL, parents and state, (2) addressing discovery problems as
soon as they come to the judge's attention and (3) encouraging in-
terested parties and the court system administration to explore a
mediation pilot project for CINA cases.
Second, the court system should systematically train all
judges, magistrates and clerks about CINA cases, both at the an-
nual judicial and magistrate conferences and at special training ses-
sions. Respondents, including judges, stressed the need for basic
education about the laws and procedures, as well as training to un-
derstand that CINA cases differ from other civil cases and the im-
portance of looking at a case from the child's point of view. Other
important topics would include education about reasonable efforts,
what to look for in case reviews, family dynamics, cultural issues,
and how actively to manage cases. To accomplish this, the court
system should develop a CINA bench book for judges and magis-
trates which would lay out the nuts and bolts of how to handle a
CINA case and include summaries of relevant state and federal
legislation, court rules and appellate decisions. The book also
should discuss appropriate timelines and case management phi-
losophy. The court system should also develop a CINA handbook
for clerks and administrators. This handbook would parallel the
judge's bench book but would focus on clerks and administrators.
Clerical and administrative understanding and oversight of CINA
cases is critical to proper review.
Third, the court should allocate sufficient judicial and admin-
istrative resources to CINA cases. In the past, the court has rec-
ognized the importance of groups of cases by establishing commit-
tees to set and monitor policy and its implementation (for
example, Rules Committees, Fairness and Access Committee and
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Mediation Task Force), designating deputy presiding judges, allo-
cating central administrative and clerical staff resources, and, in
multi-judge courts, assigning judges to specialized caseloads. The
court should consider each of these options, and other appropriate
means, to ensure that CINA cases have adequate resources.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed the statutory and case law affecting
the child in need of aid process in Alaska. It has also discussed the
findings of the Alaska Judicial Council's assessment of the CINA
court process in four Alaskan cities. Finally, it has provided a
number of recommendations to improve Alaska's foster care sys-
tem. While these recommendations will not be easy to implement,
failure to make improvements will directly lead to increased ne-
glect and abuse of Alaska's children-our most important re-
source. In addition to the impact on children and families, failure
to address problems in the system will deeply affect society as a
whole. The cost and effort of improving Alaska's foster care sys-
tem may be high, but it is not nearly so high as ignoring the prob-
lems.
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